

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

Frances B. Yeargan
Frances Yeargan, Clerk
Wayne County, Georgia

ALTAMAHA BLUFF, LLC, and)
GRANT LEWIS,)
)
Plaintiff,)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14CV0376

v.)

JAMES "BOOT" THOMAS, JOHN)
SHAVER, FRANKLIN SMITH, TIM)
COCKFIELD, AND JERRY "SHAG")
WRIGHT AS MEMBERS OF THE)
WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF)
COMMISSIONERS, WAYNE COUNTY,)
RICHARD GALLONI, MITCHELL)
JENKINS, HARRY THOMPSON,)
HOWELL CLEMENTS AND)
JERRY E. GRIFFITH, THE WAYNE)
COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSORS,)
AND AL SZOKE,)
TAX COMMISSIONER OF)
WAYNE COUNTY)
)

Defendants.

ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD

WHEREAS, the instant action pending before the Court is a class action (the "Lawsuit") brought by Plaintiffs Altamaha Bluff, LLC and Grant Lewis (hereinafter "Named Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated ("Class Members") against Defendants James "Boot" Thomas, John Shaver, Franklin Smith, Tim Cockfield and Jerry "Shag" Wright, as members of the Wayne County Board of Commissioners (the "BOC"), Wayne County (the "County"), Richard Galloni, Mitchell Jenkins, Harry Thompson, Howell Clements and Jerry E. Griffith, the Wayne County Board of Assessors (the "BOA") and Al Szoke, Tax Commissioner of Wayne County (the "Tax Commissioner") (collectively the "Defendants");

WHEREAS, the Lawsuit sought refunds pursuant to O.C.G.A. §48-5-380 for taxes that were overpaid on timberland based on the County's use of a large acreage revaluation and schedules declared invalid by the Superior Court of Wayne County;

WHEREAS, this matter is currently before the Court on Named Plaintiffs' Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award to Class Representatives (the "Fee Application");

WHEREAS, a Final Approval Hearing was scheduled for October 20, 2020 as set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order entered on August 31, 2020 and as made known to the Class Members through the notice procedures (the "Notice Program") approved by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order to consider among other things the Fee Application;

WHEREAS, No objections to the Fee Application were filed with the Court; and

WHEREAS, the Court having considered the entire records of this Lawsuit, including the Fee Application, the evidence presented, including but not limited to the Affidavit of James L. Roberts, IV dated September 22, 2020 (the "September 22, 2020 Aff.") and the Affidavit of James L. Roberts, IV dated October 13, 2020 (the "October 13, 2020 Aff.").

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:

1. The Fee Application requests an award of attorney's fees to Class Counsel in the amount of \$700,000.00, reimbursement of Class Counsel's actual costs and expenses in the amount of \$12,107.39 and a service award to the Class Representatives of \$20,000.00 each all to be paid from the \$1,750,000.00 Aggregate Refund Fund established in the Settlement of this Lawsuit. As set forth below, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and holds that (a) the requested attorney's fee is appropriate, fair and reasonable and is therefore approved; (b) the request for approval of reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses advanced by Class

Counsel is reasonable and justified and is therefore approved; and (c) the requested service award is appropriate, fair and reasonable and is therefore approved.

Class Counsel's Request for Attorney's Fees is Approved

2. Tax refund actions under O.C.G.A. §48-5-380, such as this Lawsuit, are considered common fund cases. Under Georgia law where a common fund is generated in litigation for the benefit of persons other than the named plaintiff, reasonable attorney's fees are paid from the fund. Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256, 260, 637 S.E.2d 4, 7 (2006). See also Coleman v. Glynn County, CE12-01785-063, CE13-01480-063 and CE14-00750-063, Superior Court of Glynn County, Order on Attorney's Fees and Costs and Service Award (Nov. 8, 2019).

3. The United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have also recognized that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from the fund as a whole. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[A] lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole.”). See also Camden I Condominium Association, Inc., et al v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Attorneys in a class action in which a common fund is created are entitled to compensation for their services from the common fund, but the amount is subject to court approval.”).

4. The controlling authority for awarding attorney's fees in common fund cases in the Eleventh Circuit is Camden I. Georgia courts rely on Camden I when awarding fees in a common fund case. See Friedrich v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 247 Ga. App. 704, 545 S.E.2d 107 (2001).

5. When deciding awards of attorney's fees in common fund cases, Georgia Courts follow the Eleventh Circuit which “made clear in *Camden I* that percentage of the fund is the

exclusive method for awarding fees in common fund class actions.” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

6. Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit evaluate the reasonableness of attorney fee awards in common fund cases by applying the following factors:

- (1) the time and labor required;
- (2) the novelty and difficulty of the relevant questions;
- (3) the skill required to properly carry out the legal services;
- (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of his acceptance of the case;
- (5) the customary fee;
- (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
- (7) time limitations imposed by the clients or the circumstances;
- (8) the results obtained, including the amount recovered for the clients;
- (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
- (10) the “undesirability” of the case;
- (11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the clients; and
- (12) fee awards in similar cases.

Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772, n.3 (citing factors originally set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). These factors are hereinafter referred to as the “Camden I Factors”.

7. In support of their request for attorney’s fees equal to 40% of the common fund, Class Counsel presented Class Counsel’s September 22, 2020 Affidavit. The Class Counsel’s September 22, 2020 Affidavit analyzes each of the Camden I Factors and concludes that every applicable factor supports the reasonableness of the instant fee request. The Court independently

has analyzed the Camden I Factors against the unique facts of this Lawsuit and concludes that every applicable factor supports the reasonableness of the instant fee request.

8. The eighth Camden I Factor looks to the amount involved in the litigation with particular emphasis on the monetary results achieved in the case by class counsel. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Fla. 2006). The Court finds that Class Counsel achieved an excellent result for the Class and that the eighth Camden I Factor supports Class Counsel's fee request.

9. Here, the result obtained provides for not only the recovery of the tax overpayments by Class Members for tax years 2011 to 2019, but also likely future tax relief to the Class and to future owners of large acreage parcels containing timberland. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶35.

10. The direct benefits to the Class Members include immediate cash payments from the \$1,750,000.00 Aggregate Refund Fund. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶35. Each Qualified Class Member (as defined in the [Proposed] Consent Judgment) will receive his or her pro-rata share of his or her calculated tax refund up to 100% of the total calculated refund due from the Aggregate Refund Fund less Fees and Expenses (as defined in the [Proposed] Consent Judgment). Id. at ¶31.

11. In addition to this immediate cash benefit to the Class Members the Proposed Consent Judgment should provide tangible benefits – tax dollar savings – into the future since the trial court order, which was affirmed on appeal, held that the use of the schedules based on the Invalid 2008 Revaluation to value the property of the Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members was improper. Id. at ¶35.

12. The Court finds that the first, fourth and seventh Camden I Factors – the time labor, preclusion of other employment, and the time limitations imposed – support Class Counsel's fee

request. In short, Class Counsel engaged in this Lawsuit for six (6) years against worthy, highly competent adversaries representing the Defendants and obtained extraordinary results in the Settlement. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶¶15, 43-44.

13. Class Counsel's September 22, 2020 Affidavit confirms that Class Counsel expended significant resources researching and developing the legal theories and claims presented in the Complaint and Amended Complaints in this Lawsuit. Class Counsel defended a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment and opposition to a motion for class certification and a motion for summary judgment. Id. at ¶45.

14. Class Counsel's September 22, 2020 Affidavit also confirms that Class Counsel expended significant resources in researching, developing, briefing and arguing many legal issues that arose. Those issues included among others, the Refund Statute, stare decisis, statute of limitation, statutory interpretation, sovereign immunity, proprietary of Class Representatives' refund claims under the Refund Statute, ability to recover expenses of litigation and the refund calculation. Id. at ¶46. Class Counsel's September 22, 2020 Affidavit further confirms that Class Counsel filed, served or reviewed over 9,000 pages of documents. Id. at ¶48.

15. According to Class Counsel's September 22, 2020 Affidavit, Class Counsel and its staff invested not less than 1,000 hours on this Lawsuit. Id. at ¶63.

16. The Court does not doubt that this Lawsuit took an enormous amount of Class Counsel's time and frequently required prioritizing this Lawsuit over other work and/or required the turning down of new work that would have interfered with the vigorous prosecution of this Lawsuit.

17. The Court finds that the second, sixth and tenth Camden I Factors – the novelty and difficulty of the issues, whether the fee is contingent, and the “undesirability” of the case – support Class Counsel’s fee request.

18. The Court finds that in undertaking to prosecute this complex Lawsuit entirely on a contingent fee basis, Class Counsel assumed a significant risk of non-payment or underpayment. Courts have long recognized that “a contingency fee arrangement often justifies an increase in the award of attorney’s fees.” Lunsford v. Woodforest Nat’l Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200716, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (internal citations omitted). See also In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2020 WL 256132, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020).

19. This Lawsuit involved difficult and novel issues as evidenced by the fact that this Lawsuit spanned six (6) years and has been up to the Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court.

20. Class Counsel faced numerous risks throughout the pendency of this Lawsuit. There was the inherent possibility of failing to certify the class or having the Lawsuit dismissed at the pleadings stage or upon a motion for summary judgment. Because the Lawsuit involved the County, there were also risks concerning sovereign immunity. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶¶44-47.

21. The Court finds that the fact that Class Counsel skillfully addressed these novel and difficult issues, achieving an excellent result for the Class Members, supports the requested fee.

22. The Court finds that the fifth and twelfth Camden I Factors – the customary fee and awards in similar cases – supports approval of Class Counsel’s fee request.

23. The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[t]here is no hard and fast rule mandating a certain percentage of a common fund which may reasonably be awarded as a fee because the

amount of any fee must be determined upon the facts of the case.” Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774. However, the Camden I Court noted that “an upper limit of 50% of the fund may be stated as a general rule, although even larger percentages have been awarded.” Id. at 774-75 (internal citations omitted).

24. The Court finds that Class Counsel’s request for approval of a 40% fee of the Aggregate Refund Fund falls squarely within the permissible range indicated by Barnes, 281 Ga. 256 (33.33%) and Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774-75 (upper limit of 50%). The Court also finds that the fees sought in this Lawsuit is the exact percentage that was awarded in Coleman v. Glynn County, CE12-01785-063, CE13-01480-063 and CE14-00750-063, Superior Court of Glynn County, Order on Attorney’s Fees and Costs and Service Award (Nov. 8, 2019) which also was a class action for tax refund.

25. The Court finds that Class Counsel’s request for approval of a 40% fee of the Aggregate Refund Fund falls within the range of the private marketplace for standard contingency fee cases where 40% is the customary percentage. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶¶56-57.

26. The Court finds that Class Counsel’s request for approval of a 40% fee of the Aggregate Refund Fund falls within the range of the private marketplace for tax refund cases where 50% is the customary percentage. Id. at ¶¶54-55.

27. The record leaves no doubt that Class Counsel’s fee request is appropriate and comports with attorney fees awarded in similar cases.

28. The Court finds that the third, ninth and eleventh Camden I Factors – the skill, experience, reputation and ability and nature and length of professional relationship with the client – also supports approval of Class Counsel’s fee request.

29. Class Counsel effectively pursued the Named Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims before this Court, conferring a significant benefit on the Class. The Court finds that the outcome of this Lawsuit was made possible by Class Counsel's extensive experience in property tax law and tax refund matters as well as experience with complex litigation. *Id.* at ¶¶4-8, 58-62.

30. Class Counsel achieved an excellent outcome in this Lawsuit against the extremely reputable firm of Brown, Readdick, Brumgartner, Carter, Strickland & Watkins LLP including lead counsel G. Todd Carter. The Court finds that Mr. Carter and Mr. Mumford were worthy, highly competent and professional adversaries.

31. In sum, the Court finds that all of the Camden I Factors favor approval of the requested fee award.

32. Additionally, the Court finds that the reaction of the Class Members to Class Counsel's fee request also supports approval of the fee award.

33. In the Preliminary Approval Order the Court directed that notice be mailed to the Class Members (the "Full Notice"), a notice be published in The Press Sentinel (the "Publication Notice") and the County was directed to add a webpage to its website (the "Webpage") providing information about the Lawsuit and the proposed Settlement (collectively the "Notice Program").

34. The Class Members were advised through the Notice Program approved by this Court that Class Counsel would seek approval for an award of attorney's fees, expenses and service award.

35. Named Plaintiffs were directed to post Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award on the Webpage on the same day that it was filed with the Court. The record shows that the Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award was filed with the Court on September 22, 2020. On that same day

the Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award was posted on the Webpage. See October 14, 2020 Aff. at ¶15.

36. The Full Notice and the Publication Notice approved by the Court advised the Class Members that at the Final Approval Hearing the Court would determine, among other things, Class Counsel's request for an award of attorney's fees, expenses and service award.

37. Through the Notice Program the Class Members were advised that for an objection to be considered by the Court it had to be postmarked on or before October 5, 2020 and certain objection procedures outlined in the Preliminary Approval Order and repeated in the Full Notice had to be strictly followed.

38. The Court finds that each facet of the Notice Program was timely and properly accomplished. See October 13, 2020 Aff. at ¶¶11-13. See also Affidavit of Printing, Affidavit Mailing and Publisher's Affidavit attached as Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively to Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award to Class Representatives filed by Named Plaintiffs.

39. The period for filing timely objections ended on October 5, 2020. There were no objections filed within the Court ordered objection period. There has been no objection filed to date regarding Class Counsel's request for an award of attorney's fees, expenses and service award. See October 13, 2020 Aff. at ¶16. See Ingram, et al v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 691 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (few or no objections can be taken as some indication that the Class Members did not think the request was unfair).

40. Accordingly, an award of attorney's fees to Class Counsel in the amount of \$700,000.00 is approved,

The Expense Request is Approved

41. The Court finds that the request for approval of reimbursement from the Aggregate Refund Fund of \$12,107.39 in litigation costs and expenses advanced by Class Counsel is reasonable and justified. See George, et al v. Academy Mortgage Corp., 369 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1386 (“Because Class Counsel has lost the use of this money for nearly three years, the expenses required are reasonable and necessary.” Citing McLendon v. PSC Recovery Sys., 2009 WL 10668635, at *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136999, at *4 (N.D. Ga. 2009)).

42. This sum corresponds to certain actual out of pocket costs and expenses that Class Counsel necessarily incurred and paid in connection with the prosecution and settlement of this Lawsuit. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶65.

43. Accordingly, \$12,107.39 in litigation costs and expenses is approved.

The Service Award Request is Approved

44. “[T]here is ample precedent for awarding incentive compensation to class representatives at the conclusion of a successful class action.” David v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146073, 2010 WL 1628362. at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2010). Courts have consistently found service awards to be an efficient and productive way to encourage members of a class to become a class representative.

45. For the last six (6) years Altamaha Bluff, LLC served as a class representative and for over two and a half (2 ½) years Grant Lewis has also served as a class representative, undertaking the burdens and risks of representing the Class.

46. The Court finds that as the Altamaha Bluff, LLC and Grant Lewis provided invaluable assistance to counsel in this Lawsuit by among other things, locating relevant

documents, participating in conferences with Class Counsel and attending and testifying at hearings. See September 22, 2020 Aff. at ¶38.

47. Accordingly, a service award in the amount of \$20,000.00 for Altamaha Bluff, LLC is approved and a service award in the amount of \$20,000.00 for Grant Lewis is approved. See Ingram, 200 F.R.D. 685 (awarding class representatives \$300,000 each, explaining that the magnitude of the relief the class representatives obtained on behalf of the class warranted a substantial incentive award).

Conclusion

48. Class Counsel's Application for Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Service Award to Class Representatives is GRANTED for the reasons set forth above.

49. Class Counsel are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of \$700,000.00 from the Aggregate Refund Fund to be paid no later than 15 days from the date of this Order and to be paid in accordance with the provisions of the [Proposed] Consent Judgment.

50. Class Counsel are awarded \$12,107.39 in advanced litigation costs and expenses from the Aggregate Refund Fund to be paid no later than 15 days from the date of this Order and to be paid in accordance with the provisions of the [Proposed] Consent Judgment.


51. The Court further awards the Class Representative Altamaha Bluff, LLC \$20,000.00 as a service award from the Aggregate Refund Fund to be paid no later than 15 days from the date of this Order and to be paid in accordance with the provisions of the [Proposed] Consent Judgment.

52. The Court further awards the Class Representative Grant Lewis \$20,000.00 as a service award from the Aggregate Refund Fund to be paid no later than 15 days from the date of this Order and to be paid in accordance with the provisions of the [Proposed] Consent Judgment.

53. Without affecting the finality of this Order, the Court retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to protect and effectuate this Order, and for any other necessary purpose.

54. The Clerk shall promptly enter this Order in the docket of this Lawsuit.

SO ORDERED. This 19th day of Oct., 2020.


Judge David L. Cavender
Senior Judge